In this paper, we present the dynamics of a Neo-Keynesian model applied to a small open economy in order to study the impact of openness on the choice of the appropriate ination targeting policy. In the event of exogenous shocks, we can use either a CPI ination targeting policy or a domestic ination targeting policy.
1 Introduction Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) dene the ination targeting as a framework of monetary policy characterized by:
1. Public announcement of an ocial quantitative objective for the rate of ination over one given period of time.
2. Ocial announcement to the public that the principal goal of long run of the monetary policy is a low and stable ination.
3. The responsibilisation of the central bank to reach its objectives.
The ination targeting policy became popular toward 90's years, since this date several developed and emergent economies started to adopt this new monetary strategy.
The literature trying to explain the various aspects of the ination targeting is abundant, we can cite Ben Bernanke et al. (1999) , Amato and Gerlach (2002) , Truman (2003) , Giannoni and Woodford (2003) , Martin et al. (2004) , Carare and Stone (2006) and Sanchez-Fung (2008) .
Why the countries target ination? The reasons are varied: First, it contain ination and make it converge towards a target value, second, it increase the credibility of the monetary authorities, third it anchor inationary anticipations of the economic agents and ensure a stable economic environment for a constant expansion and nally it eliminate the diculties resulting from the monetary targeting.
Degree of Openness and Ination Targeting policy 2.1 Degree of Openness and Ination
Taking into account a high degree of openness 1 in the emerging markets and the sensitivity of these economies to the import and export of some goods, the variations of exchange rate can have very fast eects on ination. Calvo and Reinhart (2001) estimate that the transmission of exchange rate uctuations to the domestic prices is four times more important in the emerging markets than in the developed ones. Ho and Mac Caulley (2003) compiled a several empirical studies undertaken over the period 1980-2000, they showed that the degree of pass-through, related to an important degree of openness, is higher in the emerging markets.
Nevertheless, we can say that a high degree of openness have some ambiguous eects. On 1 the degree of openness is measured by the Ratio: Imports/GDP in Volume, Romer (1993) one side, a higher degree of openness means that the economy is strongly inuenced by the transmission of exchange rate variations to prices, which brings us to a positive correlation between the degree of openness and ination.
But on the other side, by considering the economies adopting ination targeting the continual search of credibility leads to a weak ination in the most open countries. That can be explained by the interest of the central bank to minimize the variability of price level, which limits transmission of exchange rate variations to consumer good's prices. Kydland and Prescott's research (1977) , the paper of Romer (1993) illustrates the relation which binds ination with the degree of openness, it shows according to an empirical study relating to 114 OECD countries, that in the case of absence of a well dened monetary policy, a high degree of openness involves important variations in the ination rate. Whereas in the presence of an explicit monetary rule centered on the control of prices, Romer (1993) shows that there exists a negative relation between the degree of openness and the variability of ination.
The aim of this paper is to study, in case of exogenous shocks, the relation between the degree of openness of the economy and the variable that we should target( CPI Ination or Domestic Ination). So, we will try to study the impact of an important degree of economy's openness on key variables such as ination, output gap, exchange rate and interest rate when we adopt several ination targeting policies. Then, we will check whether the choice of the The choice of which variable to target has been for a long time discussed in the literature.
The variability of exchange rate can have a direct or an indirect eects on prices through the change in the price of the imported consumer goods. In the case of small open economies, dependence towards the rest of the world through the imports, plays a very important rule to sustain domestic economy. In this case we have a consumption basket largely composed of imported goods, implying that the degree of openness inuences in a remarkable way the price's variations. In other words, the more the economy is open towards outside, the more the prices will be sensitive to a change of exchange rate, leading to more complicated control of ination.
Consequently the central bank face two choice: targeting CPI ination which precisely includes the degree of openness in a complete way through the imported consumer goods, or targeting domestic ination which also includes the variations of exchange rate but in an incomplete way through the price of the intermediate imported goods. Nevertheless, Svensson (2000) nd that a strict CPI ination targeting uses the direct channel of exchange rate to stabilize short-term CPI ination, involving important uctuations of real exchange rate, nominal interest rate and terms of trade.
We also nd some partisans of domestic ination targeting policy, Conway et al. (1999) stress that the domestic ination targeting does not include the direct eects of exchange rate variations, involving a reduction in the variability of real output, nominal interest rate, foreign exchange rate and domestic price. Gali and Monacelli (1999) and Clarida et al. (2001) suggest also that an optimal monetary policy must be focused on domestic ination. But on another side, Adolfson (2001) , McCallum and Nelson (2001) show that an optimal monetary policy must be centered on CPI ination. Inspired by this divergence of opinion evoked in the literature, we try throughout this paper to explain the monetary authoritie's choice of policy that should be adopted.
The goal of this paper will be rst, to formulate a NK model applied to a small open economy and to use it in order to study the macroeconomic characteristics of the adoption of dierents ination targeting policies. Finally, we will try to study which ination targeting rule would be optimal, in terms of social welfare.
Our article will be organized as follows: in the rst part, we will present our model with microeconomic fundations which includes a representative household, a rm, a government and a monetary authority. In a second part, we will try to solve the model with the method of Blanchard and kahn (1980) , by considering the case of Chile as an example of small open economy. And nally, in the last part we will report our results and our conclusion.
3 The Model
Our model presents an adaptation of a Neo-Keynesian model applied to a small open economy.
The starting point of our analysis is a model with stochastic growth which includes monopolistic competition and nominal prices rigidity, Calvo(1983) . First,we focus on study of consumers and producers behavior in one of these economies considering several ination targeting rules. But before starting our analysis, we make a short remark on the notation we adopt throught this article. Our interest focus on the study of a small open economy and its interaction with the rest of the world, therefore the not indexed variables will refer to the modelled economy. The other variables indexed by i ∈ [0.1] refer to one of the economies which constitute the rest of the world and nally the variables with an asterisk correspond to the rest of the whole world.
The modelled economy is represented by a central bank, a tax authority which is the government, a representative consumer and a competitive producer. Time is considered as discret.
Households
Our small open economy is inhabited by a representative consumer k whose utility function is given by;
with; 0 < β < 1 is the discount rate, C t (k, j) consumption of consumer k for good j, ψ the frishien elasticity and L t (k, j) the labor provide by the consumer k to produce a goodj.
The budget constraint of an individual household is given by;
with B t+1 is the repayment of the period t+1 for debts contracted at the period t, W t is the nominal wage, T R t is transfer of the gouvernment, G t,t+1 = (1 + i t ) −1 is the factor of actualization between the period t and the period t+1 and τ is the wage's tax imposed by the gouvernment.
In order to maximize his utility the representative consumer chooses to optimize his con-sumption C t and the quantity of labor L t under the budget constraint formulated by the equation (2), we obtain the following rst order conditions ;
The expression (3) represents the Euler equation for consumption whereas the expression (4) corresponds to the Euler equation for labor. The index of total consumption C t is dened by;
with η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic goods and the foreign goods and γ corresponds to the proportion of the domestic consumption allocated to the imported goods.
The index of domestic goods consumption C H,t is dened by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) ;
with; j ∈ [0.1] indicates the variety of the consumed good.
3
The index of imported goods consumption C F,t is expressed,
with; C i,t is the index of the quantity of goods imported of countries i and consumed by the domestic households, it is denes by the function,
with θ is the elasticity of substitution between the various varieties of the goods in the same economy and ζ the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the dierent foreign economies.
The optimal allocation for the various goods allows us to deduce the demand functions for each category of goods,
is the price index of the imported goods of country i expressed in domestic currency.
It is followed from there that the optimal allocation for imported goods is,
is the price index of the imported goods expressed in domestic currency.
Taking the equation (5), we have the optimal allocation for the various goods,
with
is the total consumption price index (CPI).
Firms
We suppose a xed number of rms with monopolistic competition held by the households, their number is standardized to 1. Each rm produces a dierentiated good and use the same technology. The production requires one factor of production which is labor,
with Z t represent an exogenous factor of technology, and L t (j) is the quantity of labor used to produce a good j.
The model include price rigidity as in Calvo (1983) we suppose that only a fraction of rms is authorized to adjust its prices each period. For this period, each rm is face to the probability
(1 − α) correspondent to the adjustment of his price, independently of the last period in which the rm has adjusted its price.
we note P H,t (j) the xed price by the rm at the period t, under the assumption of Calvo (1983), P H,t+k (j) = P H,t (j) with a probability α k pour k=0.1.2... .
The producers are a monopolistic competitors, so each rm have a demand function expressed by:
The prot function of rm will be noted;
with α is the probability that the producing consumer maintains the same price of the previous period and M C n t =
(1−τ )wt Zt is the nominal marginal cost 4 .
The problem of the producer will be to nd the price P H,t (j) which maximizes the prot function(10) under demand constraint(9).
The rst order condition is given by:
from where we deduce the expression of the optimal price (in log) for a representative rm which adjusts his price at the period t,
with p H,t is (log) domestic price, µ = log(
) corresponds to (log) of the mark-up at the 4 Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy, Monacelli (2005) stationary state andmc t+1 is (log) of the marginal cost at the stationary state.
Equation (12) shows us that the decision of xing prices is Forward-Looking. The reason is that the rms at the time when they adjust their prices suppose that this price will be valid during a given number of period and thus they adjust it like a mark-up of anticipated marginal cost's average and not only current marginal cost.
Government
We suppose that the government adjust its budget each period. The budget constraint of the government is given by:
This equation shows that the transfer of the gvernment equalizes the domestic income on which we applies a tax rate τ , this latter eliminates the distortions on the market related to the monopolistic power of the rms (Flexible prices equilibrum and rigid prices equilibrum ).
Relation between Domestic and Foreign Prices 3.4.1 Price level and Terms of Trade
Before beginning our analysis of equilibrum, we introduce certain denitions:
we dene the term of trade between the domestic economy and country i by:
. The eective term of trade will be noted S t = P F,t P H,t , the log linearization of this equation gives us
While replacing in the expression of the price index P t , there we obtain a linearized expression of the price level CPI:
Thus, we can dene the log of CPI ination,
It follows from this expression,
with π H,t = p H,t − p H,t−1 is the domestic ination and π F,t = p F,t − p F,t−1 is the foreign ination.
The equation (16) link the two measure of ination (Domestic and CPI) through the terms of trade and the coecient γ which dene the degree of economy's openness.
Financial Market
we suppose in this article that the international nancial markets are complete. 5 . This important assumption enables us to say that in such a case we don't need an international diversication of our portfolio, therefore the transitory shocks do not have permanent consequences, which simplies considerably our analysis.
We formulate the Euler equation as:
with E i,t is nominal exchange rate between the domestic economy and country i.
By combining the equations (3) and (17) we obtain:
with Q i,t = E i,t P i t /P t is real exchange rate and κ =
is a constant term. We will suppose for the rest of this article that we have an identical environment and thus we don't have to hold foreign assets, therefore κ = 1. The assumption of complete markets 6 is translated through the equation (18), which associates domestic and foreign consumption with the real exchange rate.
By aggregating the expression (18) for the whole of the economies, we lead to the following expression:
Uncovered Interest Parity
Under the assumption of a complete nancial market, the domestic price of a foreign good is given by the uncovred interest parity:
is the factor of actualization for period t+1. We take a linear form of the preceding expression and agregate it on the whole of small economies i, we nd the expression of uncovered interest parity:
4 Aggregation of the Model
The modelled economy is dened as a sequence of quantities,
a sequence of price,
and an interest rate rule, i t .
Equilibrium on goods and services market
Model at steady state
We resolve our model by supposing that: Z = 1, P mL = W P
,P H,t = P F,t = P t = P * The equilibrium on goods and services market, requires a level of production for all j [0.1], which satises the following condition:
with; C H,t (i, j) is demand of country i for good j produced in the domestic economy.
Combining equation (18) with the denition of aggregate output
we obtain:
with: S i t is the eective term of trade of country i, whereas S i,t is term of trade between the domestic and the foreign economy. Using the form of the expression (24) at the steady state we nd:
with ω = σζ + (1 − γ)(ση − 1). An analogical condition for country i allows us to write the following expression:
Aggregating the latter for the rest of the world 7 , we obtain:
with y * t is the foreign output and c * t is the foreign consumption of the rest of the world. Combining (19), (25) and (26), we obtain the expression of domestic demand:
If we replace the equation of output (25) into the Euler equation of consumption, we obtain the expression of the aggregate demand:
with: Θ = (σζ − 1) + (1 − γ)(ση − 1), i t is the nominal interest rate, π H,t+1 is the domestic ination at the period t+1 and y * t+1 is the foreign output at the same period.
Aggregate Supply
Taking the expression of the price obtained by maximization of the prot function of rm, we obtain the expression of domestic ination which represent a formulation of the Phillips curve of new Keynesian (NKPC):
with k γ = λ(σ γ + ρ z ) ,λ =
(1−βα)(1−α) α and x t = y t − y f lex is the output gap which is the dierence between the domestic output y t and the output obtained at exible price equilibrum y f lex .
At this stage, we notice that the degree of openness of the economy γ aects the dynamics of ination through the slope of Philips curve in other term through its impact on output gap.
The expression of domestic ination combined with (16) allows us to nd the expression of 7 We suppose that
a phillips curve for CPI ination:
Monetary Policy
We consider a simple Taylor rule according to which the central bank adjust nominal interest rate in response to anticipated ination and delayed interest rate. Svensson (1997) considers that the monetary authorities when they target ination, they always have an even implicit target of production. Our choice for a simple policy of Taylor, which includes ination and interest rate, implicitly includes an adjustment of output through the expression of aggregate supply presented more in details in the previous part. The monetary policy is given, then, by the following expression:
with: ρ i is the degree of smoothing of interest rate, i t−1 is delayed nominal interest rate and π is the ination target xed by the central bank. The selected monetary rule will vary according to the variable of ination which the central bank seeks to target, then we have two types of monetary rules:
• CPI ination targeting policy :
• Domestic ination targeting policy :
For the rest of this paper we take as a reference the framework of Gali and Monacelli (2005) , we suppose that the domestic ination targeting policy guarantee at the same time a stabilization of domestic price level and output gap . This result is conrmed by Rotemberg and Woodford's resarch (1999) which suppose that if there are a transfer ratio of the government τ which is constant, that makes it possible to counterbalance the distortions associated with the monoplistic power of rms on the market and consequently these rms will adjust price by considering the case of equilibrum at exible price. While adopting a domestic ination targeting policy, prices of domestic goods will be consequently constant, which involves that the real marginal costs equalize the reverse of the mark-up 8 . The intuition is that by xing the mark-up and thus the marginal cost at their exibles price equilibrum, the rm do not may nd it benecial any more to adjust their prices and thus the domestic prices remain constant 9 .
With exible prices, the relation between the output gap x t and the marginal costmc t is formulated as follows 10 :m
When the marginal cost is stabilized on its equilibrum level, the expression combined above with equation (29) of the model shows that the output gap will be consequently constant, Gali
.
Social Welfare
In order to evaluate the social welfare while considering the two policies of ination targeting, we have recourse to approximate the second order of utility function of consumer. The social loss then will be dependant on deviation of ination and deviation of output compared to its stationary state. We refere as a starting point to Gali(2007) 
we consider now the unconditional anticipations of the equation (34) and we suppose that β → 1, the expression of social loss will be expressed in terms of variances of ination and the output.
8 we suppose that in exible price equilibrum, the marginal cost (log) equalizes the reverse of the mark-up(log);
9 Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Gali (2003) 10 For more details, see Appendix-A
The analysis of the criteria of social welfare will be done according to three cases, the rst will be our situation of reference γ 0 , then we will see the eect of a variation of this degree of openness, γ 1 and γ 2 , on the social loss variation, considering the two alternatives ination targeting rules.
6 Resolution and Calibration of the Model
Method of Resolution of the Model
The resolution of the model is carried out by the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) which is a method of resolution of linear systems. In matric form, our system can be written:
with k t is the vector of endogenous variables, A and B are the matrix of coecients and v t is the matrix containing the variables of shock.
Blanchard and Kahn stipulate that if the number of the eigenvalues of matrix A, smaller than 1, is equal to the number of predicated variables, in our case 2 variable: i t−1 and s t−1 , and that the number of the eigenvalues of this same matrix, higher than 1, equal to the number of the variables anticipated, in our case 3 variables: C t+1 , π t+1 and π H,t+1 , then we can determine a single and steady state for our matrix system.
Calibration
The choice of the variables of calibration for Chile, is based on standard values used in the literature. The choice for Chile is du to the fact that this small open economy is considered as one of the emergents economies which succeeded its ination targeting policy in comparison to the other countries. In spite of its inationary past, Chile could reach very low levels of ination during very short time by ensuring a great credibility of its monetary policy. Its dependence on outside did not prevent it to keep stable its level of ination and from thus ensuring the good behavior of its economy. The discount factor is β = 0.99. The degree of openness of the economy or the proportion of the domestic consumption allocated to the imported goods is measured by the ratio of the imports to the GDP over the period 1998-2000, [Parrado (2004) ]. This parameter will be in a rst case of reference equal to γ 0 = 0.29 then we vary it, γ 1 = 0.2 and γ 2 = 0.6, in order to see the eect of an increase in the degree of openness on the choice of the monetary policy.
This economy who is open toward outside is caracterised by an elasticity of substitution between
the domestic goods and the foreign goods equal to η = 1.5.
The elasticity of substitution between the various varieties of goods in the same economy is θ = 4.33 [Parrado (2004) ], which implies a mark-up at the stationary state µ = 26% − 27%.
According to [Moyen and Sahuc (2008) ], the reverse of Frishienne elasticity is ψ = 0.63.
The parameter responsible of the nominal rigidity of the prices is α = 0.75 for Chile, which corresponds to only one annual adjustment of the prices.
Finally, the parameters of the interest rate rule and the autoregression process of the exogenous shocks are ρ i = 0.8, ρ Z = 0.8 and ρ yF o = 0.8.
Results
The simulation of our model gives us the following results, we start by using the parameters of Chile without bringing any modication , then we modify the parameter γ which reects the degree of openness of the Chilean economy and we study the impulse response which we will have following the exogenous shocks.
CPI Ination Targeting
We suppose rst, that the Chilean monetary authorities target the CPI ination which includes at the same time domestic ination and imported ination through the foreign consumer goods.
Productivity shock
The simulation of our model gives us the following graphs which illustrate the impulse response of dierent variables, following a shock of productivity: CPI ination, Domestic ination, Output gap, Nominal interest rate, Real exchange rate, Terms of exchange, CPI price level and Domestic price level. The major goal of the monetary authorities when they adopt a CPI ination targeting policy is to stabilize the CPI price level as well as the level of corresponding ination.
Following a positive shock of productivity of 1 %, domestic ination varies but in a small proportion, whereas CPI ination remains constant. The improvement of the productivity involves a persistent reduction in the nominal interest rate which will inuence favorably the consumption and the output. The gure (2) shows us that on the one hand the increase in domestic ination involves a real appreciation whereas on the other hand, the fall of the domestic price level involves an increase in the terms of trade.
By increasing γ 1 > γ 0 , we notice that the adjustment of the variables is modied. Although CPI ination remained constant when we consider the CPI ination targeting, the other variables became much more volatile in comparison with the situation of reference γ 0 . The variability of the degree of openness inuences the aggregate supply, a modication of γ aect the slope of the curve through the output gap, which according to the equation (29) of the model implie a fall of the output gap, which generates consequently a contractionnary monetary policy that increase the interest rate.
A more important openness degree results in an increase in the imports of the foreign goods what causes an improvement in the demand of imported goods and consequently a fall in the reciprocal demand for domestic goods, which makes them less competitive for the consumers.
The equation (16) which connects two measurements of ination through the terms of trade,
shows us that an increase in the degree of openness, involves a fall of domestic ination. This eect is still conrmed, the raise in prices of the domestic goods involves a fall of the terms of trade, which implies a real appreciation of domestic currency (Equation (14)).
At this stage we can underline, that according to the impulse response of the various variables, we note that the increase in the degree of economy openness involves a greater variability translated through nominal interest rate, the terms of trade and real exchange rate.
Foreign GDP Shock
A shock on foreign variables generally have a very important impact by considering the small open economies, considering in most case that economies are very dependant on outside. So a variation of the foreign GDP is quickly transmitted on the national aggregates.
The impulse response of the gure (3) are a little dierent from those which preceding. An improvement of the foreign GDP of 1 % involves a rise in the domestic ination accompanied by a stable level of CPI ination and corresponding price level, this result is foreseeable considering the monetary policy adopted by the central bank which is the CPI ination targeting.
Following an increase in the supply of foreign goods, the monetary authorities will adopt an expansionnary monetary policy by lowering nominal interest rate in order to support the domestic output, which generates a positive output gap, which means that the level of production will be higher than the level in equilibrum state.
On another side, the fall of the domestic price level involves an increase in the terms of trade combined with an increase in real exchange rate explaining by the raise of domestic ination. This eect is amplied by increasing the degree of openness, the volatility of the variables increases in a very important way. The output gap, the terms of trade and the real exchange rate reach a volatility of 5 %. This important volatility is due to the increase in the demand of foreign goods which initially aect the price of the imported goods and considering the increase of γ, will modify the composition of CPI price level in favor of imported goods.
We could conclude at this level that a foreign GDP shock allows to an increase of the proportion of imported goods in the domestic consumption basket increasing the degree of Pass-Through towards domestic goods prices, which induces a greater volatility of economic variables, in spite of CPI ination targeting.
Domestic Ination Targeting
We applie in this part the same model but we suppose this time that the monetary authorities of Chile adopt a policy of domestic ination targeting.
Productivity Shock
We start by applying a shock of productivity by distinguishing between our situation of reference γ 0 and the adjusted situation γ 1 > γ 0 . The level of the output gap is constant by considering the rule of domestic ination targeting, which conrms the results of Gali and Monacelli (2005) .
We notices a drop in the level of nominal interest rate, thus it involve implicitly an increase of consumption and output. This increase in output is not reected through the output gap which remains constant following the shock, that is due to the fact that by adopting a target of domestic ination, the central bank leads an implicit target of output gap and then tends to bring closer the level of domestic production of the level of equilibrum of long run, [Svensson (1997) ].
Following a positive shock of productivity, the parity of interest rate can be presented as an explanation of the reaction of real exchange rate, . The fall of nominal interest rate involves a depreciation of the national currency and thus increases exports what explains in its turn the rise of the production. Gali and Monacelli (2005) still underline, that in the event of domestic ination targeting, a depreciation of the national currency, due to a shock of productivity, involves an increase in CPI ination.
By increasing the degree of openness of the economy, we can say that the adjustment of the variables is made in the same manner but we notice an important volatility compared to the situation of reference. Nevertheless, this idea is not valid for real exchange rate, the terms of trades and nominal interest rate. The explanation is simple, when we consider a domestic ination targeting policy, a variation of γ lead to a variation of CPI ination without inuencing the level of terms of trade.
We notice that the level of real exchange rate will drop on a level lower than in the case of γ 0 . Finally, the stability of output gap, even with an increase of γ makes interest rate nominal insensitive to this variation of the degree of openness.
We can conclude that when we consider a shock of productivity, we notice that by comparing the volatility of variables with two dierent targeting monetary rules, we can stress that the degree of transmission of the exogenous variations is more important with a domestic ination targeting policy. In addition, with a CPI ination targeting policy, we nd that the PassThrough is less important and thus the reaction of the variables to an increase of γ, is less marked with a volatility on average not exceeding 0.5 %, [Flamini (2007) ].
Foreign GDP Shock
We present in this part the impulse response of Chile with a domestic ination targeting policy to a shock of foreign GDP. We compare, as mentioned above, a rst case γ 0 to a second case in which we have γ 1 > γ 0 . The rst remark that we can notice by comparing the impulse response for an increase in the foreign GDP, it is that volatility is much less important with a high degree of openness , this is valid for a domestic ination targeting rule. In fact, when we target domestic ination, the domestic goods price does not vary and thus the variations of terms of trades are very small.
The stability of the output gap is accompanied with a small variation of interest rate compared to the situation where we have a monetary rule centered on CPI ination. We can say at this level, that by considering a foreign shock, the domestic ination targeting policy oers more stabilizing characteristics for the domestic price level, the level of ination corresponding and the output gap what, in the event of increase of γ, does not inuence in an important way the behavior of the economic variables.
While referring to the preceding results, we say that when we consider the case of reference γ 0 , it is more optimal for Chile to adopt a CPI ination targeting policy in the event of domestic or foreign shock. Whereas by increasing the degree of openness, the choice of monetary policy becomes dependant of the nature of the exogenous shock. For a domestic shock such as an improvement of the productivity, the optimal rule is the CPI ination targeting, whereas for a foreign shock such as the increase in the demand of the imported goods the optimal rule would be the domestic ination targeting.
Social Welfare
In this part, we try to evaluate the social welfare in case of CPI ination targeting and domestic ination targeting, by highlighting the impact of the variation in the degree of openness.
CPI Ination Targeting Domestic Ination Targeting
Productivity shock Foreign GDP shock Productivity shock Foreign GDP shock one treat a particular case. In the rst case we take as reference γ 0 = 0.29, we nd that for a CPI ination targeting, the variance of CPI ination is equal to zero, which is explained by the adopted policy, whereas with a domestic ination targeting policy, the variance of CPI ination become signicant. Nevertheless when we target the domestic ination, the situation is reversed for the output gap, the variance becames near to zero, which conrmed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) . The loss in social welfare however is much important by considering this monetary policy. For the second case γ 1 < γ 0 , we notice that the variability of output gap increases as well as the degree of social loss. This remark is reversed by considering the domestic ination targeting policy, more the degree of openness is lower, more the loss in social welfare as well as the variance of ination decrease. In the last case γ 2 > γ 0 , we notice that for a CPI ination targeting policy, the variance of the social loss evolves in opposite direction with the degree of openness, whereas the output varies in the same direction as the openness of the economy. For γ 2 = 0.6, the variance of the social loss is equal to 0.0669 against a variance equal to 0.1193 for γ 1 = 0.2. Whereas, the output variance for γ 2 is equal to 0.1857 compared to 0.1657 for γ 1 = 0.2. The situation is reversed by considering the domestic ination targeting policy.
We conclude that an open economy may nd benecial to adopt a CPI ination targeting policy because it oers a more important prot in social welfare, by minimizing the variance of the social loss function and CPI ination.
Conclusion
We tried throught this paper to study the impact of a high degree of openness on the choice of the ination targeting policy which should be adopted by the central bank. We applied a neo-keynesian model caracterised by nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition, we take the case of Chile as a reference. We nd on the one hand that there is a signicant dierence in the impulse response when we consider the two ination targeting policies (Domestic and CPI ination targeting). And in the other hand, there is a link between the adopted monetary policy and the nature of the exogenous shocks. By taking the case of reference γ 0 in which we did not modify the Chile's parameters, we nd that the optimal policy adopted by the monetary authorities would be the CPI ination targeting, which includes at the same time the variations of the domestic prices and the variations of foreign exchange rate, this result is valid by considering a domestic or a foreign shock. Now, when we consider the case where we modie the degree of openness of the economy γ 1 > γ 0 , the choice of the optimal policy becomes dependant on the nature of the exogenous shock. With a positive shock of productivity, we notice that the degree of Pass-Through towards the economy is controlled much more with a CPI ination targeting policy than with a domestic ination targeting one. Whereas, while considering a foreign GDP shock, the choice of a rule centered on domestic ination becomes more optimal because it ensures at the same time a stability of the domestic goods price level, corresponding ination and the output gap level.
By considering the criteria of social welfare, we conclude that the increase in the degree of openness of the economy allows prots in social welfare when we consider a CPI ination targeting.
